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Abstract 
In contrast to the attention devoted to the rejection of the EU Constitutional Treaty at French 
and Dutch referenda; the Spanish referendum, where this Treaty was ratified, remained 
under-researched by political scientists. This paper analyses the voting behaviour at the 
Spanish referendum on the EU Constitutional Treaty with the use of quantitative methods 
and the concept of first and second-order elections. This paper finds that the Spanish 
referendum was a second-order referendum, because the effects of domestic political issues in 
Spain had a greater impact on the electoral behaviour of Spanish voters than had genuinely 
European issues. This finding raises doubts over the suitability of using direct democracy in 
the EU in order to raise the legitimacy and democratic accountability of the European project. 
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Spain’s Referendum on the European 
Constitutional Treaty:  
A Quantitative Analysis Within the 
Conceptual Framework of First and 
Second Order Elections  
 
1. Introduction 
Demise of the permissive consensus over the European project has placed 
pressure on European political elites to consider alternative ways for 
legitimizing the European political order by providing further legal and 
political institutionalisation. The creation of a Constitution for Europe was 
thus perceived as a panacea by the political elites to set out a new, 
incrementally more ambitious European political order, and to increase the 
loyalty of Europeans towards the EU (Castiglione in Castiglione et al. 2007:21-
22; Moravcsik in Meunier and McNamara 2007:37-38).  
Once the European Constitutional Treaty (ECT hereafter) was completed, it 
had to be ratified by all EU members, in order to come into force. While some 
member states choose to steer the ECT through their legislative chambers; 
four EU members, namely Spain, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands 
hold a national referendum on the  ECT.1 Among these four member states, 
Spain was the first country to hold a referendum on the ECT, possibly 
because Spain has been a country with high attachment to Europe. The 
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referendum in Spain took place on 20 February 2005, only a year after a new 
Socialist government was formed. The turnout rate in the referendum was of 
42.32%, 76.73% of Spanish voters voted in favour of the ECT, whilst 17.24% of 
voters expressed their opposition to the ECT (Torreblanca and Sorroza 2005: 
2-3). 
Unlike the referendum in Spain, subsequent referenda on the ECT in France 
and the Netherlands did not yield positive results, and therefore, the question 
that Spain raises is that of why Spain was different? What aspects of the 
Spanish institutional and political order made Spain different than France, the 
Netherlands and Luxembourg? Following this ratification crisis in France and 
the Netherlands, several scholars devoted their attention to analysing the 
electoral behaviour at the French and Dutch referenda and to investigating 
whether, particularly, No votes were cast based on domestic cleavages or 
European issues (e.g. Marthaler 2005, Harmsen 2005, Taggart 2006, Ivaldi 
2006). On the other hand, cases of positive integration received less scholarly 
attention. While few studies were conducted to explain the electoral 
behaviour at the referendum in Luxembourg (Hausemer 2005, Dumont and 
Poirier 2006a, 2006b); voting behaviour at the Spanish referendum remained 
relatively under-researched within the concept of first and second-order 
elections and formed rather part of a comparative study on electoral 
behaviour at all four referenda on the ECT (Glencross and Trechsel 2007). 
Initial descriptive analyses of the Spanish referendum (Malo de Molina and 
Miguel de Elias 2005, Torreblanca 2005) did not also examine the electoral 
behaviour at this referendum within the concept of first and second-order 
elections. 
The aim of this paper is to empirically explore the electoral behaviour at the 
Spanish referendum as a case study within the framework of first and second-
order elections. The main research question to answer in this study is whether 
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domestic cleavages or European issues had a greater impact on the positive 
and negative votes cast at the Spanish referendum on the ECT.2 In other 
words, this study investigates whether the Spanish referendum on the ECT 
was a first or second-order referendum. Through a quantitative analysis, this 
study finds that at the Spanish referendum on the ECT domestic cleavages 
had a greater impact on the electoral behaviour compared to European issues, 
which adds a predominantly second-order characteristic to this referendum. 
In obtaining this result, a quantitative methodology, namely binary logistic 
regression, was applied to the dataset of the post-referendum survey 
conducted by Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS). Appropriate 
variables within this dataset, which pertain to first and second-order 
characteristic of the referendum, were re-coded as appropriate and were 
tested together with certain socioeconomic and demographic background 
variables.  
The remaining parts of this study are structured as follows: Section two 
critically reviews the previous studies, which analysed electoral behaviour at 
EU referenda within the conceptual framework of first and second-order 
elections. In addition, how this study positions itself in the debate is 
explained. The third section outlines the hypotheses on the Spanish 
referendum, which will be tested through the available dataset. The fourth 
section outlines the methodology used in this study and explains which 
variables were used as well as how these variables were re-coded. The fifth 
section runs the regression test and presents the results of this statistical 
analysis. The concluding section has two aims. Firstly, it summarises the main 
findings and discusses the implications of this study with regard to the 
existing studies conducted on direct democracy in the EU. Secondly, it 
demonstrates certain implications that this study may have for constitutional 
politics and democracy in the EU. 
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2. Theoretical Explanations of Voting Behaviour at EU  
Referenda: Domestic and European Factors in Interplay 
Prior to the ECT, various member states held national referenda on their EU 
membership as well as on previous EU treaties. French referendum on the 
Maastricht Treaty, Danish referenda on its EU membership, the Single 
European Act, and the Maastricht Treaty and Irish referenda on the Nice 
Treaty are only a few examples of these.  
The literature has devoted significant attention to explaining whether voters 
cast their votes at EU referenda based on domestic cleavages or European 
issues. In explaining the electoral behaviour at previous EU referenda, 
scholars applied the concept of first and second-order elections to EU 
referenda, which was originally coined by Reif and Schmitt (1980) for the 
analysis of electoral behaviour at European Parliament (EP hereafter) 
elections. In their analysis of the results of the first direct elections to the EP in 
1979, Reif and Schmitt demonstrated that EP elections have a “second-order” 
characteristic, meaning that at these elections domestic cleavages have a 
greater influence on the votes than have European issues (Reif and Schmitt 
1980:3). 
Franklin et al. (1995) were among the first scholars to extend the framework of 
first and second-order elections to the analysis of EU referenda. They used 
this concept to analyse the electoral behaviour at national referenda on the 
Maastricht Treaty. Franklin et al. (1995:111) found that the national referenda 
on the Maastricht Treaty had a second-order characteristic, since voting 
behaviour was predominantly influenced by domestic factors, such as 
attitudes towards the government. This finding gave rise to the Franklin 
thesis, that national referenda were rather reflections of attitudes towards the 
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government, rather than being a process of issue-voting (Svensson 2002:735). 
Using the same concept, Svensson (2002) later analysed five Danish referenda 
on EU issues, ranging from the referendum on Danish entry to the EU to the 
one on the Amsterdam Treaty in 1998. Svensson’s findings show that, 
contrary to the Franklin thesis above, the five Danish EU referenda were not 
mainly second-order referenda, since ‘votes at these referenda also reflected 
Danish voters’ attitudes towards the EU and the treaties in question’ 
(Svensson 2002:748). More recently, Garry et al. (2005) examined the two Irish 
referenda on the Nice Treaty, again within the framework of first and second-
order elections. Garry et al.’s finding refutes the Franklin thesis for the Irish 
case, as they posit that the impact of “issue-voting” (i.e. attitudes towards the 
EU and the Nice Treaty) outperforms the influence of “domestic factors” on 
the votes at both referenda (Garry et al. 2005:214). Therefore, the two Irish 
referenda on the Nice Treaty are shown to be “first-order” referenda, based 
on the findings of Garry et al. 
These rigorous analyses of electoral behaviour at EU referenda, however, 
leave out one important element. These studies reveal that respective EU 
referenda were first or second-order referenda for the entire country, yet they 
do not investigate whether one can trace diverging first and second-order 
characteristics in voting behaviour when measured against different 
socioeconomic classes. Put differently, it would be interesting to know 
whether at a first-order referendum all classes in the society vote on European 
issues or whether some vote on still domestic issues. If such a diverging 
pattern exists, it would be interesting to decipher, which classes cast second-
order votes and which classes vote on European issues. 
Although previous EU referenda garnered sufficient attention from scholars, 
rejection of the ECT at French and Dutch referenda in 2005 has diverted the 
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attention of scholars to investigating the reasons of positive and negative 
votes on the ECT in those countries.  
Initial studies exploring the electoral behaviour at the French referendum on 
the ECT demonstrated the existence of a second-order characteristic of the No 
votes. A significant motivation behind the No votes was to punish the 
government and express concerns for the domestic socioeconomic situation in 
France (Taggart 2006:16-17). When measured against socioeconomic 
indicators, the second-order characteristic of No votes in France was found to 
be stronger among the unemployed in particular (Marthaler 2005:234). The 
second-order characteristic of No votes in France was, however, a contentious 
point among scholars, since one other study showed that No votes at the 
French referendum also pertained to issue-voting, i.e. to European issues 
(Ivaldi 2006:58). According to Ivaldi, these European issues, that add a first-
order characteristic to the referendum, were mainly the absence of a social 
Europe, neoliberal/free market policies of the EU, and possible Turkish EU 
accession (Ibid:58-59). In reality, however, it is dubitable whether the 
aforementioned issues are genuinely European issues, because as Moravcsik 
posits, these three issues are predominantly reflections of national or global 
concerns on European issues (Moravcsik in Meunier and McNamara 2007:39). 
For example, while criticism of neoliberal policies in the EU actually stems 
from the national opposition to globalisation; the fears over the Turkish EU 
accession are fuelled by national concerns over considerable third-country 
immigration to France and Europe. Thus, it is open to debate to what extent 
the No votes in France carried a first-order characteristic. 
With regard to the Yes votes at the French referendum, however, the picture 
changes slightly, compared to No votes. The study conducted by Dehousse 
(2006) demonstrates that the majority of Yes voters in France cast their votes 
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based on their attitudes towards the EU and the ECT, which adds a first-order 
characteristic to the Yes votes at this referendum (Ibid:156).    
For the Dutch referendum on the ECT, studies have found similar results. 
Both Taggart (2006:19) and Harmsen (2005:10-11) demonstrated that No votes 
in the Netherlands reflected both first and second-order characteristics. The 
most frequently cited reasons for voting against the ECT in the Netherlands 
were lack of information on the ECT, loss of national sovereignty, opposition 
to national government and Europe being too expensive (Taggart 2006:19). On 
the other hand, positive votes were found to possess a predominantly first-
order characteristic at the Dutch referendum on the ECT (Harmsen 2005:9-10). 
As seen from above, scholars have placed a significant emphasis on 
examining the unsuccessful referenda for the ECT.3 Disproportionately less 
attention was, however, devoted to the analysis of electoral behaviour at 
successful referenda on the ECT in Luxembourg and Spain. So far Hausemer 
(2005) and Dumont and Poirier (2006a; 2006b) have analysed the electoral 
behaviour at the referendum in Luxembourg, whilst Glencross and Trechsel 
(2007) have for the first time conducted a comparative analysis of the 
referenda in France, the Netherlands, Spain and Luxembourg. Moreover, 
while Torreblanca (2005) provided rather an analysis of the campaigns in the 
run up to the Spanish referendum on the ECT; Malo de Molina and Miguel de 
Elias (2005) only examined the effects of domestic issues on voting behaviour 
at the Spanish referendum. 
Despite these analyses of the successful referenda on the ECT, there is still 
inadequate focus on explaining the electoral behaviour at the Spanish 
referendum as a case study within the conceptual framework of first and 
second-order elections, and this study aims to fill this gap in the literature.  
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Examining the Spanish referendum as a case study has two merits. First of all, 
in a quantitative case study, potential cancelling out effects of different 
country variables are eliminated. For example, in their quantitative 
comparative study, Glencross and Trechsel (2007:14) find that the referenda in 
all four aforementioned member states were first-order referenda. Glencross 
and Trechsel, however, miss out on the possibility that in their pooled dataset, 
domestic factors in one country may be cancelling out the effects of domestic 
factors in another country, so that in the end domestic factors do not seem to 
have a significant impact on the votes. Secondly, a case study has the 
advantage of measuring variables that are specific to a country. In a 
comparative study with pooled dataset, however, the researcher will not 
necessarily incorporate certain explanatory variables into the analysis, which 
may significantly matter for one country in the dataset but not for others.  
        
3. Spain’s Referendum on the European Constitutional 
Treaty: Hypotheses within the Framework of First and 
Second-Order Elections 
In examining the Spanish referendum within the concept of first and second-
order elections, the hypotheses below will be tested with the use of a 
quantitative method. These hypotheses were constructed based on actual 
political events that took place in Spain prior to and during the campaigns on 
the referendum for the ECT. 
The first set of hypotheses tests the second-order characteristic of the Spanish 
referendum on the ECT: 
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H1: Given the paucity of a genuine European debate concerning the 
content of the ECT during the referendum campaigns in Spain 
[Castiglione in Castiglione et al. 2007:24], it is expected that a 
significant amount of Spaniards have voted based on domestic political 
cleavages. As a result, the Spanish referendum on the ECT carries a 
second-order characteristic.  
H1.1: Previous studies have found that in Luxembourg, France and the 
Netherlands pro or anti-government attitudes had an impact on the 
outcome of referenda [Taggart 2006, Harmsen 2005, Hausemer 2005]. 
It will be thus hypothesized that in Spain attitudes towards the 
incumbent Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero and his government also 
had an impact on the voting behaviour of Spaniards at the referendum 
on the ECT. This condition also adds a second-order characteristic to 
the Spanish referendum.  
The second set of hypotheses concerns the first-order characteristic of the 
referendum: 
H2: In line with the hypotheses posed by Glencross and Trechsel 
(2007:6), it is expected that positive attitudes towards the EU and the 
ECT in Spain have a positive impact on the vote at the polls. This 
condition makes the Spanish referendum a first-order referendum, as 
voters cast their votes based on European issues and/or on issues 
pertaining to the content of the ECT. 
H2.1: Medrano (1995:84) finds a statistically significant positive 
correlation between possessing a European identity and supporting 
European integration in Spain. By taking Medrano’s finding as an 
anchor, it will be hypothesized that possessing a European identity 
had a positive impact on the vote for the ECT in Spain, in order to 
support further integration. Since the votes cast under a strong 
European identity relate to attitudes towards the EU and/or the ECT, 
this condition also adds a first-order characteristic to the referendum.  
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Finally, the positive and negative votes cast on the ECT at the Spanish 
referendum will be tested together with certain socioeconomic and 
demographic background variables. These background variables are: age, 
gender, level of education, economic activity, religion of the respondents and the 
autonomous community in which respondents live. Among these variables, the 
following hypothesis was posed for religion:  
H3: There was significant emphasis on religious affairs during the 
campaigns on the ECT, both through the radically Catholic Aznar 
government in Spain and the lobbying of Aznar government by the 
Pope for including references to Christianity and God in the ECT (Closa 
2004:335-337). Moreover, the conservative ABC newspaper, in 
particular, defended the idea of referring to Christianity and God in the 
constitutional text (Jiménez and Sampedro 2005:14). Despite these 
demands, however, the ECT did not refer to Christianity and God. 
Based on this fact, it will be hypothesized that Catholic voters in Spain 
were more likely to vote against the ECT.4 
These hypotheses will be tested in section 5. Before running the statistical 
analysis, however, it is worth introducing the dataset and variables used in 
this study to test the aforementioned hypotheses, which is the focal point of 
the following section. 
 
4. Data and Methodology 
4.1. Dataset 
The dataset used for testing the hypotheses in the previous section stems from 
the post referendum survey of Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS), 
entitled Estudio CIS no.2595 – Postreferendum sobre la Constitución Europea. 
Main features of this dataset are presented in Table 1 below. 
Ozgur Erkan 
                                                                                                                                      
11 
Table 1: CIS Survey no. 2595 - Features 
Sample size (N) 
2487 
 
Fieldwork date 
26 February – 4 March 2005 
 
Standard error of 
the survey 
± 2% at 95.5% confidence level 
Area covered by the 
survey 
166 municipalities and 17 provinces in 
17 Spanish autonomous communities 
 
In addition to the CIS survey 2595, there is a second dataset available on the 
Spanish referendum, namely Flash Euro-barometer 168 (Flash EB-168 
hereafter). In this study, however, CIS survey was preferred to Flash EB-168 
for two reasons: Firstly, the CIS survey places weight on the beliefs of 
respondents, unlike Flash EB-168, which was an influential socio-
demographic factor during the referendum campaigns, due to the debate over 
whether there should be any references to Christianity and God in the 
European Constitution [Closa 2004:335-337]. Since religious factors mattered 
during the campaigns, incorporating this variable into the analysis can have 
an impact on the results. Secondly, compared to Flash EB-168, CIS dataset 
includes more than one measure of attitudes towards the EU, both through 
the evaluation of European identity and the reaction of Spaniards, in case the 
EU dissolved tomorrow. The existence of more than one variable on attitudes 
towards the EU gives the researcher ample opportunity to measure the first-
order characteristic of the referendum from different perspectives. 
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4.2. Variables used in the Regression Analysis 
4.2.a. Response Variable 
The response variable used in this study reflects Spanish voters’ choice on the 
ECT. The original survey question asks the respondents how they voted on 
the ECT and it has four possible choices: Voting in favour of the ECT, voting 
against the ECT, blank vote and don’t know. Since this analysis aims to find 
out whether Spaniards voted in favour of or against the ECT based on 
domestic or European issues, blank votes and don’t know answers were 
excluded from the analysis. The response variable was named voting 
constitution and recoded into a dichotomous variable with 1= voting in favour 
of the ECT and 0= voting against the ECT.  
 
4.2.b. Explanatory variables 
Socioeconomic and Demographic Variables  
The dataset includes socioeconomic and demographic variables, such as 
education, gender, age, economic activity and religious affiliation of the 
respondents, which were incorporated into this study. The reason for making 
use of these variables in this study is the significance of some of these factors 
in explaining EU-related votes, as propounded by Anderson and Reichert (in 
Glencross and Trechsel 2007:8).  
The socioeconomic and demographic factors used in this study are: 
Age: continuous variable, with a range of values between 18 and 93 
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Gender: dichotomous variable, recoded as gender(1) = males and gender(0) = 
females. The reference category was taken here as gender(0), which was thus 
not demonstrated on Table 2 in section 5. 
Education: categorical variable, demonstrating respondents’ completed level 
of education. The original variable consists of eleven categories, yet to be able 
to analyse this variable, it was clustered into five categories and recoded as 
follows: Education(1) = less than five years of schooling, Education(2) = primary 
school education, Education(3) = secondary school education, Education(4) = 
occupational training, and Education(5) = tertiary education. “Don’t know” 
and “no comment” answers were excluded and Education (5) was taken as the 
reference category. 
Religion: dichotomous variable, reflecting the Catholicity of respondents. The 
original survey question asked the respondents which religion they belong to, 
and comprised five categories. The variable was re-coded here into a dummy 
variable with Religion (0)= the respondent is a Catholic, Religion (1)= the 
respondent either belongs to another religion or does not believe in God. 
Religion (0) was taken as the reference category here. 5 
Autonomous Community: categorical variable, indicating the autonomous 
community a respondent resides in. The variable had originally seventeen 
categories, i.e. each community being a category. To be able to analyse this 
variable, however, it was clustered into the following three categories, based 
on the level of positive and negative votes cast on the ECT at each 
autonomous community: Autonomous Community (1)= Communities where 
less than 70% of the residents voted in favour of the ECT. The communities in 
the first category are Navarra, the Basque Country and Catalonia. Autonomous 
Community (2)= Communities where more than 70% but less than 75% of the 
residents voted in favour of the ECT, i.e. Madrid. Autonomous Community (3)= 
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all other communities with the highest level of votes in favour of the ECT, 
where the level of Yes votes did not fall below 76.5%. The autonomous 
communities in this category are Aragón, Andalucía, Asturias, Balearics, 
Canary Islands, Cantabria, Castile-la-Mancha, Castile-and-León, 
Extremadura, Galicia, Murcia, Rioja and Valencia. Autonomous Community(3) 
was taken here as the reference category. 
Economic activity: categorical variable, indicating the occupational status of 
the respondents. The variable included initially nine categories, yet the “other 
situation” and “no comment” categories were expunged from the analysis. 
The variable was then recoded into the following five categories: Economic 
Activity (1)= Employed; Economic Activity (2)= Retired; Economic Activity(3)= 
Unemployed; Economic Activity (4)=Student; Economic Activity (5)= Housework 
(unpaid). Economic Activity(5) was taken as the reference category. 
 
Variables on the First-Order Dimension 
Identity: categorical variable, measuring whether the respondents possess 
only European, only Spanish or dual (i.e. both European and Spanish) 
identity. The survey question encompassed six possible choices, yet “don’t 
know” and “no comment” choices were excluded and the variable was re-
coded into the following categories: Identity(1)= only European identity; 
Identity(2)= only Spanish identity; Identity(3)= dual identity; Identity(4)= any 
other identity not mentioned above. Identity (4) was taken as the reference 
category here. Since the first and third categories of this variable pertain to 
European issues; it was taken as a variable on the first-order dimension. 
EUphile: categorical variable, indicating the level of support for European 
integration in Spain. The question in the survey asks the respondents how 
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they would react if the EU dissolved tomorrow and did not exist anymore. 
The variable had originally seven categories, yet “no comment” answers were 
expunged. The categories of having “no opinion” and “being indifferent to 
the dissolution of the EU” were clustered together as one category and the 
variable was re-coded as follows: EUphile(1)= Being happy about the 
dissolution of the EU tomorrow; EUphile(2)= Disapproving of the dissolution 
of the EU tomorrow; EUphile(3)= Being indifferent on this issue. EUphile(3) 
was accepted as the reference category. 
Constitutionphile: categorical variable, measuring the respondents’ attitude 
towards the ECT. The variable had initially seven categories, yet the 
categories with “indifferent” and “no opinion” answers were clustered 
together and the variable was re-coded into the following categories: 
Constitutionphile(1)= The ECT is a bad thing for Europe; Constitutionphile(2)= 
The ECT is a good thing for Europe; Constitutionphile(3)= Being indifferent to 
the ECT, which is also the reference category here. 
 
Variables on the Second-Order Dimension 
Support for Zapatero: dichotomous variable, displaying confidence in the 
Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero and his government. The variable had 
originally six categories. The variable was re-coded into a dummy variable by 
clustering the positive answers of “great confidence” and “enough 
confidence” into one category and the negative responses of “little 
confidence” and “very low confidence” into another category. As before, 
“don’t know” and “no answer” options were left out. Of these two categories, 
Support for Zapatero(1) shows low confidence in Zapatero and his government; 
whilst Support for Zapatero(0) indicates high confidence in Zapatero and his 
government, which was also defined as the reference category. 
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Party Politics: categorical variable, demonstrating the political party 
respondents voted for at the general elections of 14 March 2004. The variable 
initially comprised seventeen categories; yet “blank votes” at March 2004 
elections, as well as “don’t know” and “no comment” answers were excluded. 
The political parties were then recoded into the following three categories 
based on their attitude towards the ECT: Party Politics(1)= parties strongly in 
favour of the ECT, i.e. PSOE (Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party), CC (Canary 
Coalition); Party Politics(2)= parties officially in favour of the ECT, albeit 
experiencing internal fragmentations regarding the content of the ECT, i.e. PP 
(People’s Party), CiU (Convergence and Union), PNV (Basque Nationalist 
Party); Party Politics(3)= parties strongly against the ECT, i.e. IU (United Left), 
ERC (Catalonian Republican Left), EA (Basque Solidarity), BNG (Galician 
Nationalist Bloc), Naforra-Bai (Navarra Yes) and CHA-Aragon (Aragonese 
Council) [Malo de Molina and Miguel de Elias 2005:78; Torreblanca and 
Sorroza 2006:1]. Party Politics(3) was taken as the reference category. 
Left-Right Politics: categorical variable, which measures the self-positioning 
of voters on the left-right political space with regard to domestic politics. The 
variable was re-coded into five categories as follows: Left-Right Politics(1)= far-
left voters; Left-Right Politics(2)= centre-left voters; Left-Right Politics(3)= voters 
at the centre; Left-Right Politics(4)= centre-right voters; Left-Right Politics(5)= 
far-right voters. Left-Right Politics(5) was taken as the reference category here. 
 
4.3. Methodology 
Given that the response variable (voting constitution) is a dichotomous 
variable, a binary logistic regression was used in this analysis, which was 
computed using the SPSS software. In line with other regression tests, firstly a 
partial model was constructed, which encompasses the following 
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socioeconomic, demographic background variables as well as variables on the 
second-order dimension: age, autonomous community, economic activity, 
education level, gender, religion a respondent is attached to, left-right politics, 
party politics, and support for Zapatero. The partial model was then developed 
into a full model by adding the following explanatory variables on the first-
order dimension: identity, constitutionphile, and EUphile.  
The effects on the response variable of all aforementioned explanatory 
variables were measured based on their respective reference categories and 
by taking into account the statistically accepted significance levels. Moreover, 
the Nagelkerke R2 and the -2log likelihood values were closely observed 
throughout the analysis, to confirm the capability of both the partial and the 
full model in explaining the variations of the response variable.  
To also control for the effects of multicollinearity in the full model, bivariate 
correlations for all explanatory variables were computed on a crosstab, which 
were kept in sight throughout the analysis. The issues which may arise with 
regard to the effects of multicollinearity will be addressed towards the end of 
the next section. 
 
5. Results of the Data Analysis 
The results obtained through the test of the available dataset are presented in 
Table 2 below. The data test was conducted in two steps, as explained at the 
end of the last section. Firstly, a partial model was constructed, which 
contains socioeconomic and demographic background factors as well as 
second-order variables. Thereafter, this model was improved through the 
addition of first-order variables, which leads to the full model. 
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Table 2: Partial and Full Models (with regression coefficients) for Explaining 
Electoral Behaviour at the Spanish Referendum on the ECT 
Variables          Partial Model             Full Model                            
Age    0.030***    0.039*** 
    (0.012)     (0.017) 
Autonomous Community (1) -1.203***    -1.120*** 
    (0.289)     (0.408) 
Autonomous Community (2) 0.102     0.322 
    (0.378)     (0.487) 
Economic Activity (1)  0.200     -0.621 
    (0.508)     (0.643)  
Economic Activity (2)  0.022     -0.907 
    (0.617)     (0.764) 
Economic Activity (3)  0.048     0.262  
    (0.677)     (0.904) 
Economic Activity (4)  -0.157     -0.685 
    (0.665)     (0.910) 
Education (1)   1.336     4.082  
    (1.273)     (2.751)  
Education (2)   0.728     0.973  
    (0.488)     (0.614)  
Education (3)   0.245     0.661*  
    (0.297)     (0.393)  
Education (4)   -0.086     0.355  
    (0.425)     (0.566) 
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Gender (1)   -0.169     0.029  
    (0.275)     (0.354) 
Religion (1)   -1.011***    -0.659*  
    (0.285)     (0.391)  
Left-Right Politics (1)  2.744***    3.445***  
    (0.862)     (1.214) 
Left-Right Politics (2)  2.769***    3.280***  
    (0.810)     (1.145)  
Left-Right Politics (3)  3.157***    3.509***  
    (0.724)     (1.051)  
Left-Right Politics (4)  3.101***    3.424***  
    (0.754)  (1.061) 
Party Politics (1)  2.900***    2.823***  
    (0.341)     (0.459)  
 
Party Politics (2)  2.199***    2.772*** 
    (0.492)     (0.680) 
Support for Zapatero (1)  -1.317***    -1.432***  
(0.320)     (0.454)  
Identity (1)        0.124 
         (0.777) 
Identity (2)        0.432 
         (0.538) 
Identity (3)        0.580 
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         (0.544) 
Constitutionphile (1)       -1.976** 
         (0.879) 
Constitutionphile (2)       2.719*** 
         (0.349)  
EUphile (1)        -1.228** 
         (0.560) 
EUphile (2)        1.048*** 
         (0.401) 
Constant   -3.572***    -6.935*** 
     (1.087) (1.708) 
Nagelkerke R2     0.500 (50%) 0.714 (71.4%) 
-2Log Likelihood     471.930  297.091 
Valid cases (N)        892    886 
 
Standard errors are indicated in brackets below each coefficient.  
* = p<0.1 (significant at 10% level); ** = p<0.05 (significant at 5% level); *** = p<0.01 (significant 
at 1% level) 
 
 
 
   
 
Ozgur Erkan 
                                                                                                                                      
21 
5.1. Results of the Partial Model  
An initial review of the partial model shows that among the background 
variables used; age, religion and the first category of Autonomous Community 
have a statistically significant effect on the response variable, i.e. the vote cast 
at the referendum for the ECT. Gender, economic activity, education, and the 
second category of Autonomous Community, however, are not found to have a 
statistically significant impact on the response variable under the partial 
model.  
Of the aforementioned background variables, the positive and statistically 
significant coefficient of age yields that at the Spanish referendum older voters 
were more likely to vote in favour of the ECT than younger voters, holding 
other explanatory variables constant. This finding may seem surprising, as it 
contradicts the well-established Inglehart thesis, that younger cohorts are 
more supportive of EU integration than older people (Hix 2005:162). 
However, similar studies done on analysing the electoral behaviour at 
referenda on the ECT reached the same conclusion. Ivaldi (2006:61) 
demonstrates that at the French referendum, voters aged 60 and over were 
more likely to vote in favour of the ECT, compared to younger voters. 
Similarly, Glencross and Trechsel (2007:9) found in all four EU members they 
analysed that voting in favour of the ECT was likely to increase with rising 
age. As will be elaborated in the conclusion, further research could shed light 
on the reasons of this interesting pattern found at national referenda on the 
ECT. 
In addition to age, the coefficient of the first category of Autonomous 
Communities also comes out as statistically significant. The statistical 
significance of this coefficient bears two important interpretations: Firstly, the 
coefficient of the first category of Autonomous Communities implies that ethnic 
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nationalism played a role at the referendum. As can be seen, after holding all 
other variables constant, autonomous communities with the highest level of 
ethnic nationalism, i.e. Navarra, the Basque Country and Catalonia were on 
the whole more inclined to vote against the ECT, compared to autonomous 
communities in the third category (i.e. the reference category).6 This finding 
supports the argument of Torreblanca that the ‘territorial question pulled 
down the level of Yes votes at the Spanish referendum on the ECT’ 
(Torreblanca 2005:1).  
Secondly, a closer review of the third category of the variable Autonomous 
Communities yields that, of the thirteen communities in that category except 
Rioja, Aragón and Balearics, all were Objective 1 regions under the Structural 
Fund Regulations of the EU Regional Policy at the time of the referendum 
(European Union 2005). This tends to promote the fact that residing in an 
autonomous community, which receives further financial support from the 
EU through the EU Regional Policy, makes the residents of this autonomous 
community more likely to support European integration and thus vote in 
favour of the ECT. This conclusion can be drawn in comparison to the 
autonomous communities in the first category of this variable, which were 
also among the four richest Spanish autonomous communities in terms GDP 
per capita by 2006 and which therefore do not qualify as Objective 1 regions.7 
This interpretation also buttresses the ‘utilitarian support’ argument of 
Medrano (1995). Medrano finds that support for further European integration 
in Spain is conditional on direct financial transfers from the EU and the 
economic development brought through European integration (Medrano 
1995:51), making Spaniards’ endorsement for further integration a utilitarian 
support. 
The final statistically significant background variable under the partial model 
is religion. It can be inferred from the coefficient of religion that, controlling for 
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all other explanatory variables, members of other religions or non-believers 
were less likely to endorse the ECT, compared to Catholic voters. Contrary to 
the expectations, this statistically significant finding refutes our hypothesis H3 
(Catholic voters would be more inclined to reject the ECT, given the absence 
of references to Christianity in the constitutional text). 
The partial model also yields statistically significant results for variables on 
the second-order dimension. A reassessment of the hypotheses on second-
order variables demonstrates that the results under the partial model confirm 
hypotheses H1 and H1.1.  
Firstly, the statistically significant coefficients of left-right politics imply that 
self-positioning of a voter in the left-right ideological space with regard to 
domestic cleavages helps explain the electoral behaviour of that voter at the 
Spanish referendum on the ECT. This finding provides evidence for 
hypothesis H1 (the referendum had a second-order characteristic). Based on 
the coefficients of this variable, it can be concluded that odds of voting in 
favour of the ECT were 5.75 % higher for a Spanish voter at the centre of the 
left-right dimension than a Spanish voter on the centre-right,8 after controlling 
for other variables. Similarly, the odds of voting in favour of the ECT were 
47.4 % higher for the same centrist voter compared to a Spanish voter on the 
centre-left.9  
In addition to left-right politics; party-politics is another explanatory variable on 
the second-order dimension that helps confirm hypothesis H1. Given the 
statistically significant coefficient of the first category of party politics, it can be 
concluded that, after holding all other explanatory variables constant, having 
voted for a party at March 2004 national elections, which strongly endorsed 
the ECT, increases the likelihood of voting in favour of the ECT, compared to 
the voters of anti-ECT parties.10 Similarly, the coefficient of the second 
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category of party politics asserts that having voted for a party at March 2004 
general elections, which experienced internal fragmentations regarding the 
content of the ECT, but which nevertheless endorsed the ECT, also increases 
the likelihood of voting in favour of the ECT, compared to voters of anti-ECT 
parties.11 This increase is, however, slightly less than the effect of the first 
category of party politics. It should be noted that, the results from party politics 
reveal one further crucial interpretation with regard to the variable 
Autonomous Communities. The results of the latter variable should not be 
interpreted as every resident in Catalonia and the Basque Country 
particularly, having voted against the ECT. It should be considered that 
supporters of PNV and CiU were more likely to vote in favour of the ECT, 
despite living in the Basque Country or Catalonia, compared to other 
residents of the Basque Country and Catalonia.   
Finally, the last explanatory variable on the second-order dimension, support 
for Zapatero, confirms hypothesis H1.1 (attitudes towards the government 
have an impact on the votes at the referendum). The statistically significant 
coefficient of this variable implies that expressing higher confidence for 
Zapatero and his government increases the likelihood of voting in favour of 
the ECT. The exponential of this coefficient [exp(-1.317)] yields that, holding 
other explanatory variables constant, voters not trusting Zapatero and his 
government were 73.21% more likely to vote against the ECT, compared to 
voters trusting Zapatero and his government.12 
As a result, the partial model confirms the hypotheses on the second-order 
characteristic of the Spanish referendum on the ECT. With regard to the 
background variables, as shown, the hypothesis on religion was not proved. 
Finally, the partial model found statistically significant effects for age and the 
first category of Autonomous Community of residence on the response variable, 
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yet not for the remaining background variables gender, education, economic 
activity and the second category of Autonomous Communities. 
 
5.2. Results of the Full Model 
One initial observation with regard to the full model is that, moving from the 
partial to the full model improves the model fit significantly. This tendency 
can be observed through two different indicators. Firstly, the -2 log likelihood 
ratio improves by 37.05% with the construction of the full model, as it falls 
from 471.930 to 297.091. Secondly, the notable increase in Nagelkerke R-
square from 50% to 71.4% demonstrates the high capability of the full model 
in explaining the variations of the response variable, compared to the partial 
model.  
The full model yields results with regard to background and second-order 
variables that are virtually identical to the ones found under the partial 
model. Just as under the partial model, the full model also reveals that the 
likelihood of voting in favour of the ECT increases with rising age. Similarly, 
the full model also finds evidence for the tendency that Spanish autonomous 
communities receiving further financial benefits from the EU –through the 
Regional Policy of the EU- were more likely to vote in favour of the ECT than 
autonomous communities in the first category of the variable Autonomous 
Communities. Moreover, the full model also confirms the existence of a 
territorial dimension to the referendum through the same variable, 
Autonomous Communities. The effect of religion on the votes remains 
unchanged, although this variable has a slightly lower statistical significance 
under the full model. In addition to that, statistically significant coefficients of 
the explanatory variables left-right politics, party politics and support for Zapatero 
reconfirm the second-order characteristic of the Spanish referendum under 
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the full model. The only exception under the full model is that, whilst under 
the partial model all categories of education were statistically insignificant; 
under the full model, the third category of education comes out statistically 
significant at 10% significance level. Based on this finding, it can be concluded 
only with regard to the third category of education that voters with secondary 
education were more likely to endorse the ECT compared to voters with 
tertiary education, after holding all other variables constant. It should be 
noted, that this finding does not imply the existence of a linear relation. Put 
differently, based on solely one statistically significant category of education, it 
cannot be concluded that support for the ECT in Spain rises with falling level 
of education.  
As a final step, insertion of the first-order variables constitutionphile, EUphile 
and identity into the full model proves the correctness of hypothesis H2 
(positive attitudes towards the EU and the ECT have positive effects on the 
vote for the ECT). Hypothesis H2.1 can, however, be neither confirmed nor 
refuted as the coefficients for all categories of the variable identity are 
statistically insignificant.  
One of the explanatory variables that helps verify hypothesis H2 is the 
variable constitutionphile. The statistically significant coefficient of the first 
category of constitutionphile implies that, after controlling for other variables, 
voters with a negative attitude towards the ECT were more likely to vote 
against the ECT, compared to voters with a neutral attitude towards the ECT. 
Similarly, the coefficient of the second category of constitutionphile asserts that 
voters with a positive attitude towards the ECT were significantly more likely 
to vote in favour of the ECT, compared to voters with a neutral attitude. 
Another explanatory variable on the first-order dimension, EUphile, helps 
confirm hypothesis H2. The first category of EUphile demonstrates that, after 
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holding other variables constant, voters with a negative attitude towards the 
EU were more likely to reject the ECT, compared to voters with a neutral 
attitude towards European integration. Moreover, the second category of 
EUphile indicates that voters with a strongly positive sentiment towards the 
EU tended to vote more in favour of the ECT, compared to voters with a 
neutral attitude towards the EU. As can be seen from Table 2, both of these 
aforementioned findings are highly statistically significant. 
Reassessing the question whether the Spanish referendum had a first-order or 
second-order characteristic, the findings under the full model demonstrate 
that the Spanish referendum possessed both first and second-order 
characteristics. Put differently, both domestic and European issues were 
found to have an impact on the votes at the Spanish referendum for the ECT. 
The more interesting question to ask at this stage is which of the two 
aforementioned factors had a greater impact on the votes cast at this 
referendum. In order to answer that question, fitted probabilities were 
calculated for each of the first and second-order explanatory variables, i.e. for 
EUphile, constitutionphile, identity, left-right politics, party politics, support for 
Zapatero, as well as for aggregated first and second-order variables. The 
calculated fitted probabilities for individual and aggregated first and second-
order variables are presented in Table 3 below. The second column of Table 3 
indicates, on the example of left-right politics, the predicted probability that a 
Spanish voter on the far-right (which is the reference category here) votes in 
favour of the ECT. The third column then yields the predicted probability of 
voting in favour of the ECT, if the same voter identified himself on the centre-
left instead (which is the category with the highest frequency). The difference 
between these two values shows as a percentage the effect of a change in the 
explanatory variable left-right politics on voting in favour of the ECT.  The 
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method used for calculating the fitted probabilities is described in the 
endnotes.13 
Table 3: Fitted Probabilities for First and Second-Order Variables 
Variables 
Value at dummy = 0, in 
% 
Value at dummy = 1, in % 
Change, in 
% 
Support for Zapatero 
14 
99.42 97.61 1.81 
Variables 
Value at the reference 
category, in % 
Value at the category with the 
highest frequency, in % 
Change, in 
% 
Left-Right Politics 86.57 99.42 12.85 
Party Politics 91.06 99.42 8.36 
Constitutionphile 91.87 99.42 7.55 
EUphile 98.36 99.42 1.06 
Identity 98.96 99.42 0.46 
General 
Comparison 
   
First-Order Variables 68.93 99.42 30.49 
Second-Order 
Variables 
27.70 97.62 69.92 
The fitted probabilities above indicate that most second-order variables had 
individually a greater impact on the votes for the ECT than most first-order 
variables. The calculations yield that the individual effects of second-order 
variables left-right politics and party politics on voting in favour of the ECT 
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dominate the individual effects of all first-order variables. Among the first-
order variables, only the individual effects of constitutionphile on the response 
variable can dominate the individual effects of the second-order variable 
support for Zapatero.  As a result, even the individual effects imply that second-
order variables had a greater impact on voting in favour of the ECT than first-
order variables. In order to strengthen this conclusion, however, one needs to 
compare the cumulative effect of all first-order variables on a positive vote at 
the referendum with the cumulative effect of all second-order variables.  
The final two rows of Table 3 above demonstrate the results of this 
comparison under general comparison, which show the collective impact of first 
and second-order variables on the response variable separately. A comparison 
of the collective effect of all second-order variables on voting in favour of the 
ECT with the collective effect of all first-order variables implies that domestic 
cleavages had a far greater impact on a positive vote at the Spanish 
referendum than had EU issues. As can be seen from the results in Table 3, 
moving from the reference category to the category with the highest 
frequency on all first-order variables simultaneously changes the likelihood of 
voting in favour of the ECT by 30.49%. This effect, however, more than 
doubles when all second-order variables move from their reference category 
to their category with the highest frequency (69.92%). Consequently, 
calculation of the fitted probabilities tends to promote that hypotheses H1 (the 
Spanish referendum on the ECT has a second-order characteristic) and H1.1 
(attitudes towards the government have an effect on the votes at the 
referendum) provide the ultimate answer to the research question of this 
study, whether the Spanish referendum on the ECT was a first or second-
order referendum. This conclusion contradicts the findings of Glencross and 
Trechsel (2007). As shown in section 2, Glencross and Trechsel find in their 
comparative study of all four EU member states, which held a referendum on 
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the ECT, that in these countries, including Spain, the referenda had a first-
order characteristic.   
As mentioned at the end of the last section, the potential effects of 
multicollinearity may be a cause for concern in concluding that second-order 
variables had a greater impact on the response variable than first-order 
variables. To clear any doubts about this question, bivariate correlations 
between all explanatory variables were computed on a crosstab. The crosstab 
demonstrates that the majority of the statistically significant bivariate 
correlations were low, and oscillated between 0.048 and 0.25. Only three 
bivariate correlations exceed the 0.30 level.15 These are the correlations 
between support for Zapatero and left-right politics (-0.398), support for Zapatero 
and party politics (-0.443) and education and age (-0.451). It may be assumed 
that, since support for Zapatero is highly correlated with both left-right politics 
and party politics, it may be inflating the values of these two latter variables. 
To test this presumption, support for Zapatero was excluded from the full 
model and the respective regression coefficients of left-right politics and party 
politics were measured again. The result indicates that despite the high 
correlations, support for Zapatero did not inflate the values of left-right politics 
and party politics. Excluding the variable support for Zapatero from the full 
model changes the coefficient of party politics (1), i.e. the category with the 
highest frequency used in the calculation of the fitted probabilities, from 2.823 
to 2.814 and its standard error from 0.459 to 0.438. Under the same conditions, 
the coefficient of the category of left-right politics with the highest frequency, 
left-right politics (2), changes from 3.280 to 3.144, whilst its standard error 
changes from 1.145 to1.083. These are rather small changes, where the 
variations do not exceed 5.4%. Moreover, even after the exclusion of support 
for Zapatero from the full model, the coefficients of constitutionphile(2), 
EUphile(2) and identity(3) are still smaller than the coefficients of left-right 
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politics (2) and party-politics (1). These findings imply that support for Zapatero 
does not inflate the effects of the aforementioned two second-order variables 
vis-à-vis the first-order variables in the calculation of fitted probabilities.  
With regard to the potential multicollinearity between education and age, it 
was assumed that the variable age could be pulling down the effect of 
education and making this variable statistically insignificant. Therefore, as 
done above, age was excluded from the full model and the coefficients of 
education were measured again. The findings demonstrated that excluding age 
from the full model changed the statistical significance only in the second 
category of education, which became statistically significant. Moreover, the 
coefficients of four categories of education vary only between 0.087% and 4.5%, 
when age is excluded from the full model. As a result, age neither pulls down 
the effect of education notably nor makes the entire variable insignificant. 
The ensuing findings from this data analysis have certain implications for 
previous studies done on direct democracy in the EU as well as for 
constitutional politics and democracy in the EU. The concluding section will 
discuss these implications.  
 
6. Conclusion 
Scholars analysing the voting behaviour at national referenda on the ECT 
have left the Spanish referendum under-researched as a case study. This 
paper aims at correcting this anomaly by filling this gap in the literature and 
by bringing an insight into the question whether in Spain domestic or 
European factors had a greater influence on the votes at the referendum for 
the ECT. To answer this question, firstly the hypotheses were constructed 
based on the political events that took place in Spain prior to and during the 
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referendum. Thereafter, these hypotheses were tested with an application of 
binary logistic regression to the available dataset. The test results in particular 
the fitted probabilities, implied that the Spanish referendum on the ECT 
possesses predominantly a second-order characteristic. 
The finding, that the Spanish referendum on the ECT was a second-order 
referendum, carries certain implications for existing research done in the 
context of direct democracy in the EU. This finding initially displays the 
validity of the Franklin thesis (Franklin et al. 1995) for the Spanish case. In line 
with the Franklin thesis, votes cast at the Spanish referendum on the ECT 
reflected predominantly attitudes on domestic political issues, rather than 
attitudes towards the EU and the ECT. Hence, reasons for Spanish 
referendum outcome lies in the specific dynamics of its political cycle as 
compared to the other three countries where a referendum was hold.    
The findings of this study also lend support to the hypothesis of Hug and 
Scarini. Hug and Scarini assert that referenda which are non-binding, i.e. 
consultative, are more likely to demonstrate second-order effects (in Garry et 
al. 2005:204). Given that the Spanish referendum on the ECT was merely a 
non-binding referendum (Torreblanca 2005:3); the finding that the Spanish 
referendum on the ECT possesses a second-order characteristic lends support 
to the hypothesis of Hug and Scarini.  
The second-order characteristic of the Spanish referendum, on the other hand, 
provides evidence against the hypothesis of Crum (2007). Crum posits that in 
a collusive party system, where all mainstream parties take a proximate stand 
on the issue of the referendum, the referendum tends to possess a first-order 
characteristic (Crum 2007: 67). In competitive party systems, however, where 
the government and opposition take diverging stands on the referendum, one 
would expect to observe a second-order referendum (Ibid 2007:67). This is 
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because the votes cast at the referendum will be regarded either as a reward 
or punishment for the government (Ibid:67). In the case of the Spanish 
referendum on the ECT, one finds a “collusive party system”, based on the 
model of Crum. In Spain, official party lines of both the governing PSOE and 
the main opposition party PP endorsed the ECT. According to the hypothesis 
of Crum, therefore, one would anticipate the Spanish referendum to possess a 
first-order characteristic. Contrary to the Crum hypothesis, however, the 
Spanish referendum on the ECT turns out to be a second-order referendum, 
despite the existence of a collusive party system endorsing the ECT.  
This study also carries certain implications for constitutional politics and 
democracy in the EU. Firstly, the second-order characteristic of the Spanish 
referendum is closely linked to the democratic deficit in the EU. According to 
Føllesdal and Hix (2006:552), one facet of the democratic deficit in the EU lies 
in the second-order nature of electoral campaigns for the EP elections. The 
campaigns for EP elections, which are run by national political parties, refer to 
domestic political cleavages, rather than the European issues (Ibid:552). 
Accordingly, voters elect Members of the European Parliament (MEPs 
hereafter) at EP elections based on domestic cleavages. Thus voter preferences 
on European integration are not reflected in the votes cast at EP elections 
(Ibid:552). At the EP, however, MEPs make decisions on issues pertaining to 
Europe and European integration, despite being elected on domestic 
cleavages. Since MEPs are not fully aware of the preferences of their citizens 
on European issues, their decisions at the EP will not necessarily reflect the 
preferences of their citizens on European integration. As a result, MEPs will 
not be representing the interests of European citizens, which engenders a 
democratic deficit at EU level.  
This facet of democratic deficit in the EU can similarly be applied to second-
order EU referenda, including the Spanish referendum on the ECT. Given the 
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finding that the Spanish referendum possesses a second-order characteristic, 
Spanish voters’ preferences on European integration were not predominantly 
reflected in their votes at the referendum. Consequently, if the ECT were to 
come into force, actors and institutions at EU level, deriving their power from 
the European Constitution, could take actions, which would not necessarily 
reflect the preferences of Spaniards on European issues. Therefore, at least for 
Spanish citizens, this incongruence of preferences on European issues would 
engender a democratic deficit at EU level.   
One other implication of this study can be found in the issue of increasing the 
legitimacy of the EU and citizens’ loyalty to the EU through a European 
Constitution. As shown in the introduction, an important motive for the 
European political elites in preparing a Constitution for Europe was to 
legitimise the European political order and increase the loyalty of European 
citizens towards the EU (Castiglione in Castiglione et al. 2007:21-22; 
Moravcsik in Meunier and McNamara 2007:37-38). The ensuing second-order 
characteristic of the Spanish referendum, however, casts a shadow on the 
viability of this goal. Given that Spanish votes at the referendum reflected 
predominantly domestic cleavages, rather than citizens’ stance on European 
integration or the ECT itself, the Spanish referendum did not serve to 
legitimize the European order for Spaniards nor did it increase the loyalty of 
Spaniards towards the EU. Hence, it is dubitable whether a Constitution for 
Europe can be an indispensable panacea to bring citizens closer to the EU, 
without eliminating the pattern of voting on domestic cleavages at EU 
referenda.  
This study also bears two implications for Spain. Firstly, the results of this 
study confirm the strength of ethnic nationalism in Spain, as ethnic 
nationalism in Spain proved strong enough to pull down the level of Yes 
votes at an EU-level referendum. This outcome can possibly be interpreted 
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such that because the ECT did not significantly extend the direct 
representational rights of ethnic minorities at EU institutions; historic nations 
in EU members were distanced to the ECT. Secondly, this study demonstrates 
the existence of a utilitarian support for European integration in Spain. As 
shown through the explanatory variable Autonomous Communities, Spanish 
regions under Objective 1 of EU Regional Funds expressed a greater support 
for the ECT, holding other variables constant, compared to other 
communities. Put differently, obtaining additional financial support from the 
EU was found to correspond to a greater endorsement for further European 
integration in Spain.    
Finally, the results of this study raise new questions for further research. As 
mentioned in the previous section, this study helps delineate the limitations 
of Inglehart’s thesis at national referenda on the ECT. It could be explored 
through further research, why older people endorsed the ECT more than 
younger voters, contrary to the conventional view that younger cohorts are 
more supportive of further EU integration (Hix 2005:162).  
As shown in section 2, there is still one overlooked dimension of EU 
referenda. The application of first and second-order elections framework to 
EU referenda has so far left out the question, whether EU referenda have a 
first or second-order characteristic across all social classes. Put more simply, 
the interesting question is whether all social classes vote on domestic issues at 
an e.g. second-order referendum or whether some classes still vote on 
European issues, whilst other social classes vote on domestic issues. For 
example, it would be interesting to know whether there is an elite-mass gap at 
EU referenda, such that the more educated, wealthier citizens feel themselves 
closer to the EU and thus vote on European issues whereas the less educated, 
and those with lower incomes vote predominantly on domestic cleavages. 
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Further research could identify the patterns of electoral behaviour by 
socioeconomic class at EU referenda. 
Finally, another interesting research question to analyse could be to what 
extent the media reporting on the ECT as well as on referendum campaigns 
has influenced the electoral behaviour at referenda on the ECT in Spain, 
Luxembourg, France and the Netherlands.   
 
Endnotes 
1 Some other EU members also planned to hold a referendum on the ECT. In the Czech Republic, 
the referendum required constitutional amendments. Since the political polarisation rendered 
reaching a consensus on constitutional amendments difficult, the proposal to hold a referendum 
was receded in the Czech Republic (Schönlau and Castiglione in Castiglione et al. 2007:240). 
Poland also planned holding a referendum, yet a referendum did not eventually take place in 
Poland (Ibid:241). Finally, the British and Portuguese referenda were put on hold after the 
ratification crisis of the ECT in France and the Netherlands (Ibid:241-242).   
2 Turnout at the Spanish referendum on the ECT was low compared to national elections in Spain, 
albeit was close to the turnout at 2004 European Parliament elections in this country [45.14%] 
(Torreblanca 2005:2). Although low turnouts may create concerns on legitimacy in democracies, 
the causes and consequences of this low turnout at the Spanish referendum are beyond the scope 
of this paper and could be addressed in a separate study.   
3  This trend continued with the rejection of the Lisbon Treaty in Ireland. Following the 
ratification crisis in Ireland; Holmes (2008), O’Brennan (2009) and Quinlan (2009) analysed the 
electoral behaviour at the Irish referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, which particularly focused on 
explaining the motives behind No votes. 
4 Given the dominance of Roman Catholics in Spain, hypothesis H3 refers to Catholics, rather than 
Christians in general. In selecting Catholics as a measure, the study of Montero was taken as an 
anchor, who examines the influence of Catholicism, rather than Christianity, on the votes in 
Spanish politics (Montero 1994).   
5  The reason for recoding religion into a dummy variable is to test hypothesis H3 (Catholic voters 
expected to vote against the ECT). It could be argued that measuring the frequency at which 
religious voters practice could be a more appropriate way to evaluate hypothesis H3. Another 
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variable in the dataset, which included this measure, however, indicated the frequency of 
practising both for Catholics and believers of other religions. Hence, it would not be the 
appropriate variable to test hypothesis H3. 
6 All subsequent comparisons in section 5 are done with regard to the respective reference 
category of each explanatory variable.  
7 In 2006, the top four Spanish regions with the highest GDP per capita were -in descending 
order- 1.) Navarra 2.) the Basque Country 3.) Madrid 4.) Catalonia.  
8 This figure was obtained through the calculation of odd ratios as follows: The ratio of a centrist 
voter over a centre-right voter is Left-right politics (3)/left-right politics (4), which is equal to 
left-right politics(3)/reference category * reference category/left-right politics(4). The first 
expression is already given in SPSS output for the partial model through Exp(B) of left-right 
politics(3), which is 23.499. The second expression is 1/ExpB [left-right politics(4)], which is 
0.0450. The multiplication of these two factors gives 23.499*0.0450= 1.0575. As a percentage, 
this means (1.0575-1)*100= 5.75%.  
9 The odd ratio was calculated in an identical way as for the endnote 8 above. Only the formula 
changes here, which is now: Left-right politics(3)/reference category * reference category/left-
right politics(2). 
10 PSOE and CC had a strongly positive party line towards the ECT. In contrast, except one state-
wide party, IU, mainly peripheral and nationalist parties had a strongly negative party line 
towards the ECT. These parties were ERC, BNG, EA, Naforra-Bai and CHA-Aragon (Malo de Molina 
and Miguel de Elias 2005:78; Torreblanca and Sorroza 2006:1). 
11 These parties were PP, PNV and CiU. The PP had internal fragmentations regarding the content 
of the ECT, as some party members bemoaned the absence of Christian values in the ECT as well 
as the loss of Spanish votes at the Council compared to the formulae under the Nice Treaty (Malo 
de Molina and Miguel de Elias 2005:80). Despite these fragmentations, the PP decided to endorse 
the ECT, as it was the Spanish negotiator of the ECT at the time of Aznar government. PNV and 
CiU did not welcome the ECT with great enthusiasm (Eschke and Malick 2006:12), as the ECT did 
not promote new rights of representation for ethnic minorities at European institutions, yet the 
party lines were nevertheless to support the ECT.  
12 This figure was obtained through the exponential of the regression coefficient: Exp(-1.317)= 
0.2679. To convert that into a percentage, one calculates (1-0.2679)*100= 73.21%.   
13 The formula used for calculating the fitted probabilities is: Logit = Constant + 40*age + 
Education(3) * 1 + Autonomous Community(1) * 0 + Autonomous Community(2) * 0 + Left-Right 
Politics(2) * 1 + Party Politics(1) * 1 + Support for Zapatero(1) * 0 + Economic Activity(1) * 1 + 
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Religion(1)*0 + Gender(1) * 1 + EUphile(2) * 1 + Constitutionphile (2) *1 + Identity (3) * 1. The 
obtained logit is fitted into the formula [1/1+exp(-logit)]*100, which gives the fitted probability 
in percentages. 
The formula above gives the fitted probability when all explanatory variables attain the value of 
their category with the highest frequency. The reason for selecting the highest frequency for each 
variable is to render the fitted probabilities representative of the entire population. Since this 
formula incorporates both first and second-order variables, the calculation uses the regression 
coefficients from the full model. 
To calculate the individual impact of first and second-order variables on voting behaviour at the 
Spanish referendum for the ECT, the variable in question was given the value at its reference 
category and inserted into the formula above. Thereafter, this variable was given the value of its 
category with the highest frequency, whilst holding all other variables constant at their category 
with the highest frequency and the calculation was run again. The difference between these two 
values gives the individual impact of this variable on voting behaviour. 
To calculate the collective impact of aggregated first-order variables on voting behaviour at the 
Spanish referendum, firstly all first-order variables EUphile, Constitutionphile and Identity were 
allocated to their reference category and fitted into the formula above. Thereafter, all these 
variables were given their value with the highest frequency, whilst holding all other variables 
constant at their category with the highest frequency and the calculation was rerun. The 
difference between these two values gives the impact of all first-order variables on voting in 
favour of the ECT. This process was repeated to calculate the collective impact of aggregated 
second-order variables on the response variable.  
14 Since for Support for Zapatero the reference category is also the category with the highest 
frequency, a special row was inserted for this variable into Table 3 with its value at 0 and 1 as a 
dummy variable. Therefore, in calculating the effect of Support for Zapatero on the response 
variable, exceptionally the change from its first category to its second category was calculated, 
rather than the change from its reference category to the category with the highest frequency. 
This exception, however, does not affect the statistical inference or interpretation. 
15 This benchmark for measuring the level of bivariate correlations was borrowed from the 
regression analysis of Glencross and Trechsel (2007:8). 
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